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The author eicpounds collision liability in the law of tug and tow.
He analyses the liability for collisions between tug and tow and be-
tween tlte towirtg unit and third vessels. The author suggests thot in
view of certain modifications introduced by the 1976 Limitation of
Liability Convention, same changes could be made in the limitation of
liability for collisions between the towing uruit and third vessels.
INTRODUCTION
Although there are no special rules in maritime law to be followed in
collision cases involving tugs and tows, these vessels have some special navi-
gational characteristics which sometimes may alter procedural regnrlations
in a case of collision. This is especially applicable in the field of limitation
of liability. Collisions at sea between vessels are actionable on proof of ne-
gligence', and this applies also to tugs and tor,vs. But since towing involves
operations in connection with the holding, pushing, pulling, moving, esoor-
ting, guiding or standing by another vessel, and since tug and tow may so-
metimes constitute a navigational unit or >flotilla<, there is undoubtedly a
unique navigattional relationship between them. This is enhanced by the fact
that the Intei'national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972) do
not allow of a divided command', so that for the purposes of the Collision
Regulations tug and tow are usually regarded as one entity (>one long stea-
mer(). Although the courts do not advocate (any longer) the doctrine of the
I International Convention for ,the Unificatio,n of Certain Rules of Law with
Respect to_Collision Between Vesrsel,s Bnnssels 1910, a,nd articl,es 644, 755 of the
(Yugoslav) Marriitime and Inter:nal-Waters Navi,gatiron Aot (1978).
2 International Regulations for Preventing Collisionis at Sea, 7972, 'in British
Shipp,ing Laws, trnternational Maritirne Law Cronvontrio,ns, London 1983, vol. 1, p.
14 ff.
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tug being legally identified with her tow, the question of their identity is
sometimes one pf fact and not of law. Then there is another specific aspect
of towage operations. Although tug and tow do not automatically belong
to the category of vessels >restricted in their ability to manoeuvre(, when
they do belong to it because of the nature of the towing operation, they are
excused. from the requirement applicable to all other vessels (save those not
under command) to avoid impeding the safe passage of a vessel constrainecl
by her draught.
All these special considerations ,applicable to tug and tow have their
repercussions on the question of oollision liability as it is presented in court
proceedings, and especially on the question of the limitation of iiability. In
this article we shall look more closely into this distinctiveness.
::
BURDEN OF PROOF
As has already been mentioned, there is no presumption of fault in colli-
sions between vessels at sea. This applies even in cases where the oollision
regiulations have been infringed. Disobedience to these regulations carries
criminal or trespass penalties, but it has no implication on the question of
presumed collision liability. In the United States of America, however, there
is still a rule of evidence to the effect, that when a ship r,vas at the time of
collision in actuaL violatio,n of a statutrory provision intended to prevent col-
lisions, it is presumed that the fault was a contributory cause of the disaster,
if not its sole cause'. In such a case the burden rests upon that ship of sho-
wing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes of col-
lision, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have beeno. In prac-
tice, however, once a breach of the collision regulations is established, it is
obvio,us that the burden of proving that vessel's fault, to all practical intents
and purposes, is discharged. The anly thing that still remains is to prove
that the fauit caused or contributed to the collision. In this sense we can
say that a proved infringement,of the collision regulations could be in court
proceedings not only psychologically, but also procedurally, detrimental to
the party which infringed them, although the causal link between the infrin-
gernent and the damage must still be proved.
COLLISION BETWEEN TUG AND TOW
When a oollision occurs between tug and her tow(s), liability very frequ-
ently turns more on the construction of the towage agreement between them
3 The so-cailled "Fennsylvania Rule< from the decision in the Pennsylvania(1873).
{ American courts assuaged this presumption by other ,ruiles o,f evi,de,nce (ma-jor'minor faul,t rule, last clear chance rujl,,e, error in extrernis rule). Most of these
rulos became obsolete w,hen the American.courrts abandoned the 
.divided 
damage
rule and by u ttnanirno,us decision of the Supreme Court in 1975 adopted the rule
of proporti,onate fault in the U.S. v. the Reliable Transport Co. (421 US 397 /1975),
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than on the actual control of the towage operations. There was an attempt in
the Unites States to limit orprohibit indemnity or exemption clauses in the to-
wage contract as being against p,ublic policy to exculpate by contract one
party (usually the tug) from liability for damage caused by its negligence to
the other party. In Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp. and a number of other
similar cases American courts disallowed the clause that the venture was
at the sole risk of the tow, or that the master and crew of the tug were the
servants of the tow'. This trend has now been reserved, yet even when it.was
at its peak there were some troopholes enabling to assuage its rigour, such
as to name the tug an additional assured on the tow's policies thus preven-
ting the subrogated insurer from suing the tugowner, or to stiprulate that the
tow require its insurers to waive subrogation against the tugo. Court practice
of many other states has aiways aliowed similar exemption and indemnity
clauses considering them part of the freedom of contract, but subjecting
them to the strict rules of contractT. Such clauses are usually inserted in
standard conditions for torvage services. So, for example, the U.K. Standard
Conditi,ons for Towage and Other Services, as revised in 1986, stipulate that,
whilst towing, the master and crew of the tug or tender shall be deemed to
be the servants of the hirer and that this litter shall be vicariously liabte
for their any act or omission'. These Conditions exempt the tugowner from
liability for, among others, damage by or to the tug resp. the hirer's vessel,
or loss of these vessels, arising from any cause whatsoever, including negli-
gence of the tugowner or his servants or agents, unseaworthiness or unfit-
ness of the tug and her gear or equipment'.
It schoulcl be observed that such stipulations cannot exempt the tugowner
from liability to third parties in relation to which there is no privity of con-
tract. The most such priovisions could achieve would be to prevent the tow
from claiming contribution or indemnity fno,m the tug in an acti,on by third
parties again.st the tow, even where the tow's liability to such third parties
arose out of the tug's negligence or breach of the towage contract'o. Such ex-
emption clauses in a towage contract are construed subject to the tug's over-
riding duty to be fit for the particular endeavour as regards her crew, tackle
and equipment at the commencement of the towage. It is, therefore, submit-
ted, that the above mentioned exemptions in the Standard Conditions will
fnnlV only to circumstances occuring after the beginning of the towage. Furt-
hermore, it is very likely that such exemptions will not affect the tug's lia-
bility where the tug abandons the tow. Exemption and indemnity clauses can
only come into operation while the towage proceeds, i.e. after its commence-
s 349 U.S. 85, 1955, A"M.C. 899 (1955).
o For more details see T. J. McKey: >Towage Contracts Since Bisso< in The
Law of Tug and Tow, I,nrterrn. Maritime Law Semrirnar, Vancouve,r 1979"
7 More on the admissibility of such clauses in B. Luk5ii: "Os,lobodenje odgo-voraosti tr ugovoru o tegljenjuu (Exemption from Liabi,liity i'n Towage Con:tracts),
Comiparative Maritime Law, Zagreb 1987, vol. 3-4.
- _ 
8 Art. 3_. printed in R. Davison and A. Snel,son: >The Law of Towageu, Lloyd's
of Lond,on Press 1990, p. 135-139.
e Art. 4.
'o Cf. the case of the Albion (1953),2 Lloyd's Rqp. 82.
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ment and before its termination. If the towage is interrupted, either law-
fully or iunlawfully (abandonment), the exemption and indemnity clauses
cannot be relied on by the tug during that interruption interval". There are,
however, some circumstances in which by contract such exemption provisions
will not be applicable. So the U.K. Standard Conditions exclude the appli-
cation of an exempti.on clause in respect of claims which the hirer proves
to have resulted directly and solely from the personal failure of the tugowner
to exercise reasonable care to make the tug seaworthy at the commence-
ment ,of the towing, and in respect ,of claims which arise when the tug, alt-
hough towing or rendering some other service, is not in a position of proxi-
mity to or risk from the hirer's vessel, and is detached from and safely
clear of any ropes, lines, wire cables or moorings associated with the hirer's
vessel.t'
Even more severe against the tow are the Netherlands Towage Condi-
tions (1951) which state that the tow will take for her account all damages,
also if sustained by third parties, even if they are due to any fault or negli-
'gencq ,on the part of the tug or to any defective equipment of the itug.
Excepted from this >omnibus clause< is only damage which the tug sustains
by her own defects or through faults or negligence by her personnel ,and da-
mage inflicted tro third vessels or property through collision with the tug,
yet even this exception is dependent on the proviso that the tow prove that
the damage was not contributed to or caused by herself". The same com-
ment made above in connection with the U.K. Standard Conditions applies
here; these provisi,ons are only part of the privity of contract and they can-
not prevent third vessels from suing and seeking damages from the negli-
gent tug.
More recent standard conditions, kowever, apportion the risk of loss or
damage between tug and tow more equitably. So, for example, according to
,Towcon< (International Ocean Towage Agreement, Lump Sum) and ,Tow-
hireu (International Ocean Towage Agreement, Daily Hire) which are widely
in use and intended for commercial towage at sea (not for port towage) the
risk is allocated in such a way that each of the vessels mentioned bears her
losses and is accountable for her own equipment and pcrsonnel, but not-
withstanding any provision to the contrary of these two standard agreements,
the tugowner has the benefit rof all limitations of and exemptions from liabi-
lity accorded to the owners or chartered owners of vessels by any applicable
statute or rule of law in force when the damage occurs,..
" Cf. Chorley and Giles, Shippi,ng Law, Loradon 7982, p.265.
D Art. 4c(i) anrd (ii). Notwithstan:ding any conrtr:ary stipulation, the tugowurer
cannot contract ouq -qf liability for death or personal inju,ry resulting from hisnegligenoe or that of his servanls and agenrts"
t3 Art. 6, printed in R. Davison and A. Srlelson, op. cit. p. 178-181.t' >rTowcon< art. 18 and ,Torvhire( art. 18 prirnted in R. Davis,on and A. Snel-
SoIr, rsP. cit. P. 140-177.
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coLLrsIoN BETWEEN TUG AND/OR TOW AND THrRD VESSELS
l
A collision involving a third vessel can happen between an innocent or
a guilty third vessel, on one side, and tug or tow, or both of them, on the
other. If the third vessel in innocent rve can have a situation where only tug
or tow is to blame, or where both of them are responsible for the collision
with the third vessel. In the case where the responsibility for collision rests
rvholty only on tug or tow, the innocent third vessel can have the culprit to
shoulder all the blame regardless of the contractual provisions between tug
and tow, though the tou,age contract may impose an indemnity in favour
of the vessel at fault or redistribute the loss in some other way. Sometimes
it is not the vcssel of the towing unit which actuallv collides with a third
vessel who is at fault, because tfie fault of the other (or another) vessel in
the towing unit may have caused or contributed to the collision, as when a
tug comes into collision with a third vessel by reason rof I faulty manoeuvre
of the tow, or when the tow was in control of the torving operation. The
principle, horvever, remains, that the negligent vessel in the towing unit is
entirely responsible for the damage inficted to the third innocent vessel.
When both tug and tow are to blame, they are both liable jointly and
scverally, and both may be sucd by the third vcssel for the whole damage.
When the third vessel was also negligent in relation to the ensuing col-
lision, the court will apportion liability in proportion to the degree of fault
of each vessel. In such a case the fault of tug and tow is assessed separately
and it is in principle r.vrong to regard them as one shipping unit for the
purpose of assessing liability. If the fault of the one of them can be impu-
ted also to the other, as when, for instance, the controlling mind (the brain)
was with the tow and the motive power (the brawn) with the tug, then they
must be regarded as one unit when liability is assessed. For the sake of com-
pleteness a case should be mentioned here when a collision happens between
a third cargo-carrying vessel and a towing unit. If both are to blame, i.e. the
third vessel and the towing unit, the cargo owners can only recover from
the negligent tug and tow (or one of them which was at fault) that propor-
tion of the damage or loss of their cargo which corresponds to the degree
of fault of the towing unit (or the negligent vessel in it), and very probably
thev will be prevented from recovering anything at all from the carrying ves-
sel because of contractual exceptions in favour of the carricr in case the loss
or damage was caused by a fault in the navigation or management of the
vessel's master or crew't.
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
In view of the fact that relatively small limitation funds must be set up
when tugs are to blame for collision damage, attempts have been made to
ils It should be mentioned that in the case of personal injunies the liability of
the ownsrs of all v€ssels at fault is joint and several (art. 4 of the 1910 Collision
Convention and ooriresponding provisions of ,national enactments such as art.759
of the Yugoslav Maritime andlnterrnal-Waters Navigation Act).
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treat the whole flotilla consisting of tug and tow(S) as one unit for the purpose
of limitation of liability, and to aggregate their tonnages (the flotilla rule). It
is now well established that the flotilla rule is inadmissible. In a collision
between a barge in tow or between a tug and a third vdssel, it is now an
established principle that liability can be limited only to the tonnage of the
negligent vessel in the towing unit, i.e. whose fault in the navigation and ma-
nagement caused the collision. This principle stands regardless of whether
tug and tow are in comrnon or separate ownership'.. Different conclusion
could be reached only in the case of carriage of goods by sea when the tug
and her cargo-carrying tow(s) are in common ownership. In the landmark
case of Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz a barge loaded with grain was being
towed up the Sacramento River in Califiornia u,hen it struck a British ship
at anchor thrrough the sole negligence of the tug. The tug and tow were in
common ownership. The U.S. Supreme Court mled that the tug and tow
were a single vessel for the purpose of a suit brought by the cargo owner
to recover damages arising ,out of breach of the carriage of goods contract.
The court was of the opinion the both tug and barge were the >offending
vessel,, by which the contract of transportation was to be effected". Ameri-
can courts demand some additional preconditions if tug and tow, engaged
in the carriage of goods, are to be considered a single vessel for the purpose
of limitation of liability. These are: (1) that there must be a contractual rela-
tionship between the claimant and the shipowner as carrier, (2) that the
vessels whose tonnages are to be aggregated should be in common owner-
ship, and (3) that they must be engaged in a single venture". This means
that even though there may be several barges in the towing unit, only the
tug and the barge(s) involved in the partio'ular contract of carriage of goods
are part of the >venture<< for limitation purposes
The situation is different when both tug and tow cause or contribute
to the loss or damage, regardless of whether they are in common or separate
orrrnership. Their owners- can limit liability only to an aggregate amount of
the tonnages of both tug and tow'', of course, if the owners of tug and/or tow
are not personally at fault. So in a recent Canadian case, when the boom of
a crane mounted on the deck of a barge struck a bridge while the barge
was being towed by a tug. The oourt held that the management of the tug
company was obliged to see to the fact that the crane was unuzually high
before altrowing the tug and tow to proceed, and that it was not a matter to
be left entirely to the tugmaster's judgement who was not furnished by his
employer with a means for an accurate determination of the crane's height
before and during the voyage. The crourt held that this was not a merely




n 273 U.S. 326 (1927).
" Cf. Kernrneth H. VoIk United States Limitation.of Liabitirty andin The Law of T,ug anrd Tow (Intem. Maritirne Seminrar, Vonmuver
" Cf. the case of the Croatian Turg The'Smjeli (1982) 2 Lloydts
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unforeseen navigational error on the part of the tugmaster, but an actual
fault and privity of the tug-company, and limitation of liability was refused2,.
As we have seen the present position is, that since the negligence which
caused the danrage must be in the navigation or management of the ship, the
liability fund should be restricted to the tonnage of that vessel in the towing
unit which caused the damage thnough,her navigational negligence. Now, with
the coming into force of the 1976 Lirnitation of Liabitity Convention, the
party wishlng to limit liability has only to show that the liabitity arose -rin
hirect connection rvith the operation of the shipu". It is here suggestect that
this could conceivably intnoduce a change in the limitation of liability of
tug and tow. In a case where only the tug is to blame for a collision with a
third vessel, there appears to be now less reason to restrict the. fund to
the usually insignificant tonnage of the tug alone, because there is no dan'
ger any m-o." in the 1976 Convention that in such a case the tow, if also held
iesponsible, would be subject to unlimited liability. In order to limit her
liability she has only to show now that it arose ,in direct oonnection with
the operation of the ship<. In such a way, to paraphrase a saying of Lord
Denning's, there would be much more room for justice in the principle uu-
derlying limitation of liability when it is applied to the law of towage, where
freqtrently a small tug, of comparatively small value, towing a great vessel
can cause great damage"
' The Westminster Tyee (Canadian Federal Cou,rt of Appeal, 21. 2. l99l), cited
in Lloyd's Maritime Law Newsletter 303, lsth Jtrne 1991.
2' Lrt. 2 (1) (a), prrinted iur British Strippimg Laws, Int. Marit. Law ConventioDs,
[,ondon 1983, vol. 4, p,2979.2 In the Brarnley lMo'ore (1963), loc. oit.
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SaZetak
ODGOVORNOST ZA SUDAR U POMORSKOM TEGLJENJU
Premda u pornorskont pravu ne postoje posebne od.reclbe za sudar tt koiem
sudietuiu brod.ovi u teglitt,..p.ostoie posebne navigacijske karakteristike te'Slie-
nia, koie ponekad nTogu znaiajno utjeiati na procesne odredbe kod sudara. Ailfor
obrailuie upravo ov-e sp-ecifitnosti kod odgovornosti za sudar. On medu njima spo-
minie tzv. >Pennsylvania praviloo u ameiiikoj sudskoj praksi i njegov itjecaj'na
teret dokaza. I{od odgov,ornosti za su.dar izmedu teglja\a i teqlienos broda aifior
Pgkazuie kroz komparalitni prikaz formulantih ugor.iora o telljeniu kako se ot1)A
odgovornost-.pretelno ravnA prenw ugovornanl tianaienju ii.ntcdu brodot,a koji
Ol-ove.u teglju tak ntnogo viSe nego pienta torne koji ie 6a niilt imao kontrolu te-glienia. On anal.izira odredbe stindaqQnih sltjeta tegljenja V'etike Britanije, Nizo-
zemske, -te tipiziranilt ugovora za tegljenje nd otvorinori mortt ,rTowcon<' i >Tow.hireo, uka.Tuiudi i na gianice stranaike'dispozicije. Zatim se osvrde na sudar iz-
medu brodova u -teg-tiu.i treiih brodova i nd doseg erga tertios ttgovornih klauzulao naknadi i osloboileniu (indenmity.and cxempti6n clauses). Nanraju prikazu-je ipitanje oslobodenja od od.gou.ornoi_t_i za Stete firi sudaru ma tugtjenia. Autoi sia.tra,.da bi primienont odiedaba Konvencije'o ograniienju od"gitvor:nosti iz 1976.
godine, Prgm? koiima stranka koja ieti oQranitii svoju'odgov'ornost irebi iamodokazlti 4?. iu.odgovonto-st nastala ,u izravnoi svezi ia opiraciiama brod.ao, mo-gla.biti otkloniena neadekvatnost i. neprauednitst dosadainje prikse, prema. koioj
mali i relativno bezvrijedan tegljai, tegle1i ttetiki brod ntoi.e'podiniii'vetik:u St'etiti.zg nl1 odgovarati re[atiuno maiini fgltdom. Autor srnatra'da'bi ei:iiriiiom b'di;-d.aba,Konvenciic.iz 1976...godine,.u3lutalu da brodovi u teglju poiirie it:eti tre-
cem brodu krivniom tegljaia, oni ntorali i ntogli ogranititi idgovornost tla novia-ni iznos dobijen'ukt.tpt6m tcinaiom tegliiti i'iielf"iog- iioia7,- -
2qo
